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Since 2004, the 3.8 km long North-South-Metro Line in Cologne with 7 underground stations is under construction. The 
running tunnels were excavated by Tunnel Boring Machines (TBM) and finished already in summer 2008. The stations, 
two emergency shafts, and an underground turn-off are to be constructed by special methodologies, applying partly cut-
and-cover methods, partly mining methods in combination with ground freezing. 
 
On March 3rd, 2009 in the open pit of the 28 m deep turn-off, an inrush of groundwater and ground material occurred 
and resulted in a total collapse of the Historical Archive of the City of Cologne consisting of five storeys above ground 
and two storeys underground. The archive contained about 33 km total length of shelves with historical documents 
partly going back to the 9th century, covering not only the history of the City of Cologne but also of the entire 
surrounding region and all Germany. Collaterally, one neighbouring building on each side of the archive also collapsed. 
Two fatalities were missing for a couple of days, covered by masses of meter-high debris. 
 
So far neither the technical nor the first juridical investigations are finalized and the earliest results are not expected 
before the end of spring 2010. Therefore, all explanations regarding the reason of the accident are based on assumptions 
only. A possible explanation seems to be a failure in the diaphragm-walls of the shaft, not visible from the bottom of the 
shaft, for example a larger hole or a severe honeycomb or a weak joint between two neighboured wall sections. 
 
A hydraulic ground seepage could also be the reason for the accident. This will be clarified by special investigations 
like seismic impulses or by digging out the deeper parts of the diaphragm-wall. 
 
The paper describes the construction methods applied, the first political reactions after the accident occurred and the 
consequences taken after the accident 
 
 
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT 
 
One of Europe’s largest building projects is under 
construction taking the approx. 4 km long North-South-
Metro Line in the about 2000 years old City of Cologne – 
an inner urban tunnelling measure, which is influenced 
by extremely tricky constructional and local marginal 
conditions (Thon & Spohr, 2003). It finally shall link the 
southern part of central Cologne to the urban railway 
network in form of a direct connection. Instead there are 
only bus routes nowadays, which represent a completely 
inadequate public transportation service as in some cases 
they have to pass through narrow winding streets in the 
historic city centre. The urban railway only reaches the 
densely populated areas of the southern part of the city 
via time-consuming and unattractive detours. In other 
words, the parts of the southern downtown and new town 
area that lack direct transporting links as a consequence 
suffer deficits that hamper urban development. 
As a result, Cologne thus decided to construct a north-
south urban metro line that will help remedy this state of 
affairs. 
The first 4 km long construction stage of the new North-
South-Metro Line mainly runs underground – with seven 
subterranean stations and one on the surface (figures 1-2). 
Towards this end, the projected tunnel route passes 
through major sections of the old Roman town – touching 
the former Roman port. It was reckoned that important 
archaeological finds will be discovered in the soil that 
had to be recovered and evaluated. Such digs have to be 
integrated in the construction cycle from the very 
beginning. The route then follows the former Roman 
north-south axis and runs along the Roman road 
connecting Cologne and Bonn through the medieval part 













The construction work began in 2003 and was planned to 
be finished in 2011 after a period of altogether 8 years 
including furnishing the stations and equipping the 
running tunnels with all the technical installations before 
the new line opens. The estimated overall costs amounted 
to around 650 million Euro for this section 
A large number of different marginal conditions have to 
be taken into account during the development and design 
of inner urban tunnel facilities, which include many other 
special tasks in addition to the technical requirements for 
realizing the project. Intensive exploitation of inner urban 
areas and clashes among road-users and residents with 
respect to their various interests also signify that major 
construction measures of this nature can often only be 
undertaken under considerable difficulties. These factors 
influencing construction have to be set alongside the 
basic static-constructional, technical, hydrological and 
soil mechanical marginal conditions at the preplanning 
stage and often require innovative solutions to 
accomplish the project – resulting from a technical-
economic comparison of the various possible approaches. 
The roughly 4 km long route for the projected north-
south urban railway mainly runs underground on account 
of the various inner urban factors of influence. The tunnel 
sections are for the most part located in water-bearing 
quaternary Rhine deposits consisting of sands, gravel 
sands and gravels. However, over a relatively short 
section they also pass through the deep-lying fills of the 
Roman port basin. 
The two parallel single track running tunnels of the 
southern section with an internal diameter of 7.3 m were 
driven by mechanical means continuously from the 
starting shaft in the south to the target shaft in the north 
over a length of about 2.7 km using TBMs with an 
external diameter of 8.4 m (fig. 3). These were finished in 
summer 2008. 
The underground stations and special structures partly are 
constructed by cut-and-cover and partly by trenchless 
methods. The basic concept for producing the 
underground station buildings involves the integration of 
the platforms in the side areas of the pre-driven tunnel 
tubes and connecting the side platforms at running level 
by means of cross-passages created by mining means. 
The generous cross-sectional design of these connecting 
structures with clear dimensions of approx. 9.0 x 3.5 m 
thus calls for high demands both on the formation of the 
subsurface freezing that will fulfill a sealing function and 
stabilize driving as well as on the stability of the single 
shell constructions in the segmental linings. The access 
structures for the stations will be produced in diaphragm 
excavation pits, which will continuously be set up 
between the running tunnel tubes. 
This combined construction method was applied for 4 of 
the 7 underground stations. The 3 others were built by 
cut-and-cover method. 
Conventional cut-and-cover method is also used for 
setting up the Waidmarkt turn-off, whose diaphragm 
walls are extended down into practically impermeable 





Figure 3. TBMs for southern section. 
 
 
2. THE ACCIDENT 
 
On 3rd of March 2009 during the final excavation work 
for the 28 m deep open pit of the Waidmarkt turn-off a 
catastrophic accident happened in the early afternoon. 
The seven storeys high Historical Archive of the City of 
Cologne collapsed including one neighbouring building 
on each side (fig. 4). This Historical Archive hosted 33 
km of shelfs containing numerous original documents, 
some older than 1200 years. These documents are 
covering the history of the City of Cologne but also of the 
surrounding Rhine area and partly also of entire 
Germany. Two fatalities were missing for a couple of 
days covered by masses of debris. 
On the day of the accident the circumferential 
diaphragm-walls of the Waidmarkt pit were completely 
finalized and dived for at minimum 5 m into the less 
permeable tertiary ground formations underlaying the 
sandy-gravelly quartery coverlayers. The final depth 
reached about 45 m below surface. The excavation works 
inside the shaft had nearly reached the finally planned 
level of 28 m below surface. The sections of the pre-
driven running tunnels inside the shaft were already 
rebuilt and the final as well as the intermediate ceilings 
were installed (fig. 5). Even the blinding concrete of the 
bottom slap was in some section already brought in. 
During this construction phase, groundwater was 
continuously pumped up to a quantity of about 200 l/s to 
lower and control the water table inside the shaft and so 
to enable the works. The four interconnections between 
the running tunnels and the shaft itself proved sufficiently 





Figure 4. Aerial view of collapsed Historical Archive. 
 
 
According to eye-witnesses about ten to fifteen minutes 
before the collapse of the Historical Archive an 
increasing inrush of water and later up to 5500 m³ ground 
materials started. This occurred in the south-east corner 
of the shaft either at the bottom of the excavation or 
penetrating the diaphragm-walls in their visible areas. 
As soon as the workers realized not any longer being able 
to control this situation, they climbed up to the surface 
and warned people on the roads and in the adjacent 
buildings: About 30 users and employees of the Archive 
and about 15 inhabitants of the neighbouring houses were 
rescued this way. Unfortunately two persons were 
sleeping in one of the neighbour houses that time and 
missed the warning. They lost their lives. 
First spontaneous political reactions argued, that the 
construction of the North-South-Metro Line in the 
densely built up down town area of Cologne should never 
have been accepted and started. And furthermore this was 
focused on Cologne alone but generally seen regarding 
all densely built up city centers. This argument is 
completely wrong, because tunnelling in general is not 
dangerous and metro lines are not needed and not 
constructed in rural, but mainly in inner-urban densely 
populated areas. 
The accident did not at all occur in connection with the 
pre-running TBM drives conducted in advance to the 
excavation of the shaft for the Waidmarkt turn-off and 
finished about one year before. This shaft was built 
consecutively by means of 1.0 to 1.5 m thick and 45 m 
deep diaphragm-walls. From this point of view it was a 
normal construction site for underground parts of a 
building and not a typical tunnelling construction site. 
So far neither the immediately started technical nor the 
first juridical investigations are finalized and the earliest 
results are not expected before the end of spring 2010. 
Therefore, all explanations regarding the reason of the 
accident are based on assumptions only. A possible 
explanation seems to be a failure in the diaphragm-wall 
below the excavated level of the shaft, not visible from 
the bottom of the shaft, e. g. a larger hole or severe 
honeycomb or a weak joint between two neighboured 
wall sections. A hydraulic ground seepage could also be 
the reason for the accident. This will be clarified by 
special investigations like seismic impulses or by digging 





Figure 5. Cross section of underground turn-off. 
 
 
The accelerating infiltration of water and soil into the 
Waidmarkt shaft caused obviously a significant loss of 
ground underneath the Archive (fig. 6). This finally 
resulted in a cone of collapse outside the Waidmarkt shaft 
in which the Archive building collapsed. An idea of this 
situation is given by fig. 7. 
Soon after the accident it was started to rescue the 
precious archive documents. They are partly in good 
conditions, but partly severely damaged and were to dug 
out of debris and ground water. Up to the end of October 
2009 about 85 % of the material was recovered. It will 
take years, perhaps decades to restore the severely 
damaged precious material. For recovering the remaining 
rest of the documents, a special pit outside the 
Waidmarkt shaft has to be constructed which should also 
serve for more detailed investigations of the reasons for 
the accident. This external pit is planned to be erected 
immediately outside and adjacent to the south-east corner 
of the diaphragm box. These works are planned for 
summer 2010, so that the recovery of the rest of the 
documents as well as the final investigation concerning 






Figure 6. Assumed cause of accident. 
 
 
3. CONTROL MEASUREMENTS FOR THE 
HISTORICAL ARCHIVE BEFORE THE 
ACCIDENT 
 
Since the beginning of the construction work different 
accompanying measurements were conducted. Especially 
those regarding the Historical Archive have been: 
 
− weekly optical and tachymetric surveillance of 
movements of the structure regarding settlements 
and inclinations 
− monthly observation of development of cracks in 
walls and ceilings of the Archive building, which 
normally occur in connection with shield 
drivings 
− permanent observation of inclinometers in the 
diaphragm-walls of the Waidmarkt shaft 
− quantitative and qualitative control of the 
pumping of the ground water out of the 
Waidmarkt shaft 
 
The site supervision and management laid in the hands of 
KVB (Kölner Verkehrs-Betriebe AG), the client. They 
asked regularly for site records regarding all the most 
important measurements. They also ordered all different 
construction phases, steps and modifications regarding 
the original design proved and accepted by the authority. 
 
 
4. CONSEQUENCES TAKEN AFTER THE 
ACCIDENT 
 
Following the first measures for stabilizing the situation 
after the accident are listed and briefly described (see also 
Reinarz 2009): 
1. Immediately after the accident and the 
interruption of the ground water lowering a total 
of about 2900 m³ concrete was poured into the 
Waidmarkt shaft to balance the buoyancy and 
stabilize the situation.  
2. In addition concrete barrier walls were erected in 
the connected 4 running tunnels to stop any 
propagation of a mixture of soil and ground 
water into the already completed northern and 
southern tunnel sections and underground 
stations. 
3. Specific soil-mechanical tests were conducted to 
check the remaining stability of the shaft and the 
neighbouring buildings. 
4. Automatic measuring systems were installed to 
detect any further movements, settlements and 
deformations of the shaft walls. During the next 
couple of months, some of them were read and 
evaluated 4 times a day. Meanwhile the 
frequency of data reading was reduced to once a 
day. 
5. Additional experts were involved to check and 
supervise the basic statical and procedural 
concepts of the originally planned methods of 
construction, controlling and management of all 
sites regarding the North-South-Metro Line in 
Cologne following the principle of „Second 
Opinion“. 
6. A new site supervision has been installed (the 
client will not any longer be the supervisor at the 
same time). 
7. The information policy of the public and the 
municipal bodies was revised, improved and 
intensified. This includes in first line also the site 
directly affected by the accident. The local and 
regional media like daily newspapers, but also 
audio and video channels get provided with news 




Figure 7. Assumed cone of collapse. 
 
 
8. On the owner‘s side, the number of personnel 
was extended. This counts especially for the 
sections of controlling and management of the 
works along all other parts of the North-South-
Metro Line of Cologne, which are still under 
construction. 
9. Furthermore, the activities in the departments of 
the owner dealing with matters of insurance, 
financing and juridical aspects have significantly 
grown. 
10. STUVA was asked to assist and consult the 
owner KVB, to check and evaluate the proposals 




5. CLOSING REMARKS 
 
From the technical point of view, tunnelling can be 
regarded as being very safe as long as skilled planning 
and execution is applied. This is proven by statistics of 
many successfully finalised projects of hundreds of 
kilometres metro lines and underground stations in 
comparison to the worldwide very few severe accidents 
during the last decades. 
In Germany e.g. about 600 km of metro lines were built 
since 1965, with only two accidents causing fatalities: 
Munich 1994 and Cologne 2009. 
But generally the following also has to be kept in mind: 
Underground construction asks for permanent and 
intensive observation of the interaction between ground 
and the structure under construction. Any unforeseen 
development or deviation from the prognoses has to be 
followed carefully and the concept of construction 
adapted to all changed conditions. 
A fair sharing of risks between client and contractor 
concerning change of conditions is most important. 
All numerical prognoses are to check concerning their 
plausibility and controlled by independent, well 
experienced and most skilled experts. The principle of 
„Second Opinion“ is recommendable.  
The site manager and supervisor should not only check 
the list of delivery of materials and the completeness of 
the recordings of the measurements. Generally spoken 
they should also in addition – as far as needed – evaluate 
critically the results of each single measuring campaign, 
but also of the entire chain of various measurement 
activities considering the mutual dependencies. In general 
they contribute to solving possibly occurring problems. 
As a résumé it can be stated: 
All staff involved (workers, supervisors, engineers, 
managers, etc.) have to be aware of their responsibility. 
They have to form a team and keep in mind an optimum 
technical solution all the time and not primarily minimum 
costs. The first priority has always to be the safety of 
personnel, of the structure as well as of the life and 
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